


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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY

ALIGNMENTS AMONG CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADERS
(Reference Title: POLO II-57)

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY

Alignments Among Chinese Communist Leaders

This study is a working paper. Attempting briefly to explain the functions of the principal organs of the Chinese Communist Party and government, it offers some preliminary conjectures as to alignments among the Chinese Communist leaders who occupy the key positions in those bodies. The study considers centers of power apart from Mao Tse-tung, and discusses alignments in terms of four hypothetical groups: an "organizational" group around Liu Shao-chi, an "administrative" group around Chou En-lai, a "military" group around Peng Te-huai, and a "police" group of party police and public security figures. (The last page of the study is a graphic presentation of the discussion in these terms). The views expressed herein are tentative, and the study may be useful only as an indication of the intelligence gaps which must be filled before any such analysis can be firmly founded.

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ALIGNMENTS AMONG CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADERS

SUMMARY

Concept of Alignments.....Par. 1-3

The concept of alignments refers to associations among Chinese Communist leaders which have been sufficiently close and lasting to suggest that a given individual is a friend, a patron or a protégé of another individual. Personal relationships have long been important in Chinese politics, and probably still are. There is enough material at hand on the careers of Chinese Communist leaders to support some preliminary speculation as to current alignments.

Mao's Predominance.....Par. 4-5

Mao Tse-tung clearly continues predominant in the Chinese Communist Party, due to his prestige, his positions, and the presence in top party and government posts of more of his protégés than of any other party leader. Mao's four top lieutenants are Liu Shao-chi and Chou En-lai (both protégés of Mao), Chen Yun (apparently a Mao-Chou protégé), and Teng Hsiao-ping (apparently a Mao-Liu protégé). These five persons--plus a sixth nominal leader--make up the CCP politburo's standing committee, the core of party power. Of the other 18 members of the politburo, which displays a variety of talents, 11 seem wholly or in large part protégés of Mao.

Liu and Chou.....Par. 6-8

Liu Shao-chi and Chou En-lai seem to qualify as centers of power in addition to Mao, and they may already be somewhat in competition with each other. Liu's position appears to be the stronger, for several reasons. Two other politburo members, Teng Hsiao-ping and Peng Chen, can be tentatively aligned with Liu; these three may be the core of an "organizational" group drawing its strength from the party structure. Four politburo members, only one of whom (Chen Yun) seems as important as either Teng or Peng, can be tentatively aligned with Chou; these five may be the core of an "administrative" group with strength primarily in the government.

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Other Centers of Power.....Par. 9-12

Chen Yun may conceivably be the center of an "economists" group, including politburo members Li Fu-chun, Po I-po, and Li Hsien-nien. For the time being, however, Chen and Li Fu-chun are considered as followers of Chou En-lai, and Po and Li Hsien-nien are not aligned with anyone. A third center of power--in addition to Liu and Chou--appears to be Peng Te-huai, the dominant figure in a "military" group. Tentatively regarded as a fourth center is an unidentified leader, possibly politburo member Kang Sheng, of a "police" group comprised of party police and public security figures. Four other politburo members--Lo Jung-huan, long concerned with political control of the military, Ulanfu, boss of Inner Mongolia, and propagandists Lu Ting-i and Chen Po-ta--would perhaps be major assets to any group contending for power, and cannot be aligned with any group.

The Party Secretariat.....Par. 13-15

Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping of the politburo's standing committee probably have the largest roles in directing the very important work of the party secretariat, which among other things directs and co-ordinates the work of the party's central departments and committees. Teng Hsiao-ping and Peng Chen are the two ranking members of the secretariat, thus making a formidable combination of the three key figures of the conjectured "organizational" group. Three other members of the secretariat are aligned with the "organizational" group, one with Chou's "administrative" group, and one with Peng Te-huai's "military" group, while three are not aligned.

The Party's Central Departments and Committees....Par. 16-24

The central control commission is probably of little importance. The organization department, perhaps still very important, is believed to be directed by one or more members of the "organizational" group. The social affairs (party police) department, perhaps still of equal importance, is presumed to be directed by members of the "police" group. The important departments of propaganda and rural work are dominated by leaders who cannot be aligned with anyone except Mao. The directors of the industrial work department cannot be aligned with anyone. Most of the directors of the united front work department are aligned with Chou En-lai. Most of the central committees, in general of less importance than the departments, are directed by persons not yet identified. The current posts of several party leaders have not been identified.

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~~SECRET~~Top Offices of the Government.....Par. 25-31

Mao Tse-tung's office of chairman of the regime is one of much prestige but little power. The NPC standing committee is potentially an important body, but has not seemed so to date. The principal organ of the government has clearly been Chou En-lai's State Council. While Chou has probably not decided unilaterally upon his vice premiers, three of the nine important figures of this "inner cabinet"--Chen Yun, Li Fu-chun and Chen I--are regarded as Chou's followers. Only one, Teng Hsiao-ping, is aligned with the "organizational" group, and only one, Peng Te-huai, with the "military" group. Four--Li Hsien-nien, Po I-po, Teng Tzu-hui and Ulanfu--are not aligned. Of the three less important vice premiers, one is aligned with Chou and two are not aligned.

Staff Offices and Subordinate Ministries.....Par. 32-40

The State Council's eight staff offices direct the work of 40 of the 42 ministries. Lo Jui-ching's first staff office (security and related matters) and its important Ministry of Public Security are dominated by possible members of a "police" group. Lin Feng, director of the second staff office (education and culture), may be with the "organizational" group. Po I-po's third staff office (heavy industry), Chia To-fu's fourth staff office (labor and light industry), Li Hsien-nien's fifth staff office (finance, currency and trade), Wang Shou-tao's sixth staff office (transport and communications), and Teng Tzu-hui's seventh staff office (agriculture and conservation) are all headed by persons who cannot be aligned with any of the conjectured groups. The same is true of most of the 30 or more economic ministries subordinate to those five staff offices, although six of the ministers are aligned with the "organizational" group and two with the "military" group. (Many of the directors of those five staff offices and their friends and protégés in the subordinate ministries could plausibly be aligned with an "economists" group not now regarded as being as important as the other conjectured groups discussed herein). Li Wei-han's eighth staff office (miscellaneous affairs) is dominated by possible followers of Chou En-lai; one of the two commissions with which it may be concerned is headed by "organizational" figures, and the other by unaligned persons.

The Major Commissions.....Par. 41

The four economic commissions and the one scientific commission subordinate to the State Council appear to be

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special-purpose bodies which cut across the lines of responsibility and the functions of the staff offices. The state planning commission (long-range planning) is headed by Li Fuchun, aligned with Chou En-lai, although two of Li's deputies may belong with the "organizational" group. The national economic commission (annual planning) is headed by the unaligned Po I-po, whose deputies likewise cannot be aligned (except two with Po himself). The national technological commission (technological development) is headed by a possible protégé of Po. The national construction commission (co-ordination of construction) is headed by persons who cannot be aligned. The scientific planning commission is headed (perhaps nominally) by a probable friend of Chou's.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs.....Par. 42

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, subordinate directly to the State Council, seems to be Chou's own show. He himself is the minister and all of his deputies appear to be his followers and protégés.

The Ministry of National Defense.....Par. 43-48

The Ministry of National Defense is the only other ministry not subordinate to any staff office. Peng Te-huai as minister is believed to have authority over all of the military activities, including operations, of all arms of the service. Peng's hand shows more clearly than that of any other party leader in appointments to top posts in the military establishment. Of the seven or eight deputy ministers, three or four have been closely associated with Peng. Although the chief of staff, Su Yu, cannot be aligned with Peng, four of Su's six deputies have seemed close to Peng. One deputy C/S, not primarily a military man, appears to belong with the "police" group. At least one of the directors of the armed forces' central departments may be a protégé of Peng, while another may be a "police" figure. At least two of the armed forces' headquarters are commanded by persons who have seemed close to Peng, whereas one is commanded by a person aligned with the "administrative" group and another by a possible "police" figure. The current posts of many onetime military leaders are not known.

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1. The concept of alignments, as used in this paper, refers to associations between Chinese Communist leaders which have been sufficiently close and lasting to suggest that a given individual is a personal friend, a patron, or a protégé or follower, of another individual. This concept is not so sharp as that of factionalism, which implies a disciplined striving toward personal or political objectives in conscious opposition to other groups or to the party as a whole. Alignments reflect an earlier stage of development than factionalism.

2. There is disagreement not only about the existing patterns of alignments among Chinese Communist leaders, but even as to whether it is worth while to attempt to discover such patterns in the Chinese or any other Communist party. Some observers believe that alignments are of little or no importance, as they change too rapidly in practice. While this view cannot be dismissed, it appears to derive from observation primarily of the Soviet party. This paper proceeds from the contrary view that the evolution of the CCP under Mao has permitted the development of stable associations much more than did the evolution of the CPSU under Stalin. Moreover, personal relations have been a powerful factor in Chinese politics throughout history, and the Communists, while probably reducing the strength of this factor, do not appear to have eliminated it. No doubt alignments change over the years; for this reason if no other it has been impossible to accept in their entirety the views--as to alignments--of Chang Kuo-tao, the onetime member of the CCP politburo who left the party in 1938; even if Chang were entirely right as of 1938, it is not credible that the patterns would persist unchanged until 1953. It may be that some alignments change more or less rapidly in the course of policy disputes; for example, Teng Tzu-hui, director of the party's rural work department, seems to have been treated shabbily by Mao Tse-tung during and since the 1955 dispute on the speed of agricultural socialization, and Teng's allegiance may now lie elsewhere. There is also the possibility of very rapid changes in allegiances, at an advanced phase of any contest for the succession, in a general rush to join the winning side; but such a stage of development--that of simple opportunism, or struggle for survival--is later than that with which this paper is concerned. This preliminary inquiry is interested in those alignments which may develop into factionalism in any maneuvering for the succession, and which thus may be of considerable importance in determining which is the winning side.

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3. The tentative views on alignments expressed in this paper are based on several considerations. Of some importance are an individual's early associations, the persons with whom he grew up, with whom he studied, in China or abroad, and with whom he worked in the early years of the Chinese Communist movement. Of greater importance, in most cases, would seem to be the record of his party, military and government posts, where that record offers some clue as his patrons and protégés. Of equal importance are his writings, his reported speeches and conversations, and (in some fortunate instances) his observed behavior. Conjectures so derived may of course be mistaken in any given instance, even where the record is substantial. Moreover, the conjectures offered in this paper have been made before receipt of detailed biographies of several hundred key figures in the CCP, material which will certainly illuminate this area and compel changes in these conjectures.
4. Mao Tse-tung clearly continues predominant in the Chinese Communist Party, due to his prestige, his positions, and the presence in the top party and government posts of more of his protégés than is the case with any other party leader. Mao himself is chairman of the central committee and of its politburo, and is the senior member of the politburo's standing committee, which has no officers and is apparently to constitute the center of a "collective leadership" when Mao leaves the scene. At the CCP's eighth congress last September, the central committee and politburo were given four vice chairman: Liu Shao-chi, Chou En-lai, Chu Te and Chen Yun--four longtime lieutenants of Mao who in recent years have been described as Mao's "close comrades-in-arms" and consistently ranked in that order. Mao, those four, and fast-rising Teng Hsiao-ping, secretary general of the central committee, became the politburo's standing committee, which seems the core of party power by virtue of its authority to act for the politburo between its meetings. Of these five lieutenants, the old military leader Chu Te has long seemed unimportant, useful to the party only as a figurehead chairman of the government if Mao predeceases him or steps down. The other four seem genuinely the four top leaders of the party, after Mao. Of these four, Liu and Chou have clearly been protégés of Mao, owing their rise more to Mao than to anyone else; Chen Yun seems to have been brought along by both Mao and Chou, and Teng Hsiao-ping seems to have been a protégé of both Mao and Liu.
5. The CCP politburo as a whole exercises the authority of the central committee between plenary sessions in directing

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"all the work of the party," most importantly, that of formulating basic policies for the party and regime and of making appointments to key posts in the party and regime. It seems improbable that the politburo's role is simply that of endorsing decisions already made by the standing committee; Mao appears to have assembled a variety of genuine talents (in addition to rewarding some old comrades), with a view to genuine discussions of policy. On the other hand, due to Mao's prestige and the domination of the politburo by his protégés, it seems highly probable that Mao's will on major matters finally prevails. Mao as the leader--still a considerable distance from his lieutenants--presides over: Liu Shao-chi (his favorite lieutenant), Teng Hsiao-ping and Peng Chen, a trio believed to be concerned primarily with party affairs; Chou En-lai and Chen Yun, concerned primarily with government work as premier and senior vice premier; Chou again and alternate (nonvoting) member Chang Wen-tien, responsible for foreign affairs as minister and senior deputy; Chen Yun again, Li Fu-chun, Li Hsien-nien, and alternate member Po I-po, the four leading figures in economic affairs; Peng Te-huai, the regime's top-ranking active military leader; Chu Te, once commander of the armed forces, and Lin Piao, Chen I, Liu Po-cheng and Ho Lung, the other four (besides Peng Te-huai) of the five principal field commanders of the old days, who probably advise on military matters; Lo Jung-huan, possibly still responsible in part for political control of the military; Tung Pi-wu, concerned with supervisory and disciplinary questions; alternate members Lu Ting-i and Chen Po-ta, concerned with propaganda and theory; alternate member Ulanfu, boss of Inner Mongolia and a spokesman for minority nationalities' affairs; alternate member Kang Sheng, possibly responsible in part for the party's secret police; and Lin Po-chu, oldest of the party elders. Six of these persons seem to be of much less importance than the others: Chu Te, Lin Po-chu and Tung Pi-wu (all past 70); Lin Piao, once Mao's favorite military leader, but who has been very sick for years and is apparently confined to an East China sanitarium most of the time; and Liu Po-cheng and Ho Lung, no longer active as military leaders and apparently playing small roles in the party and government. Of these 22 members and alternate members of the politburo (in addition to Mao), 15 seem to be wholly or in large part protégés of Mao: the top five members after Mao--Liu, Chou, Chu Te, Chen Yun and Teng Hsiao-ping--both Lins, both Pengs, the other two Chens, Tung, Lo, Lu, and Kang. No doubt Mao's approval was required for the membership of the other seven leaders who cannot readily be aligned with Mao.

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6. Mao's predominance being evident, there is the more interesting question of actual or potential centers of power apart from Mao, and of primary or secondary allegiance (after Mao) to such persons by other party leaders, a question which might prove of great importance if Mao were no longer holding the top leadership together. The two leaders who seem to most observers principally to qualify are Liu Shao-chi and Chou En-lai. They appear to be the persons of greatest stature after Mao in the Chinese Communist movement, to have played and to play still the leading roles in operating the party (Liu) and the government (Chou), and to be the most likely to have acquired strong personal followings in their many years as Mao's top two lieutenants. There is no good evidence to support rumors that their relations are unfriendly. However, they do seem to be different and possibly uncongenial types; there have been fragmentary indications that their roles, while generally complementary, have in part conflicted; and there has been a somewhat different emphasis in their pronouncements on certain questions of policy which perhaps cannot be attributed simply to their differing roles. Liu's position appears to be stronger than Chou's. Liu has been the party's second-ranking leader since at least 1945, he has spent many more of the past 20 years at the center of party power than has Chou, he has probably been the principal overseer of party affairs for the past 15 years, he is apparently Mao's choice to be the leading figure in a post-Mao collegium (like Khrushchev in the Soviet party), and there are many more of his apparent protégés than of Chou's in key party posts.

7. Two leaders at the politburo level, Teng Hsiao-ping and Peng Chen, can be tentatively, not confidently, aligned with Liu Shao-chi. Teng was associated in his early years with Chou En-lai, and became an important figure in the years after Mao Tse-tung established his leadership of the movement (in 1935). Teng has again been associated with Chou in recent years as one of his vice premiers, but Teng has been important primarily as a party leader in posts subordinate to Liu Shao-chi, posts which Liu probably had the initiative in filling. Teng was the party's chief in the Southwest, and since 1954 he has been secretary general of the central committee and one of the directors (if not the principal director) of organizational work at the center of the party apparatus. It was Teng who gave the central committee's report on the Kao-Jao case (a factional challenge to the party leadership) in 1955, and Teng gave one of the two principal reports on party affairs (Liu gave the other)

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at the eighth party congress last fall, a report in which Teng praised Liu personally; Teng was at that time named the ranking member of the new secretariat. Peng Chen's major posts in recent years have also been those in which he has been subordinate to Liu and to some if not all of which he was probably named by Liu (or by Mao and Liu together). Peng was the party's chief in Manchuria after World War II (then the most important regional post), and in 1949 moved to Peiping to become secretary of the CCP municipal committee there; since 1951 he has been concurrently mayor, and the two posts may give him something close to physical control of Peiping; since 1954 he has been Liu's deputy on the NPC standing committee which supervises Chou's state council. Peng has been active in liaison with other Communist parties, and has almost certainly played, with Teng Hsiao-ping, some role in the party's organizational work; at the eighth congress he was named the second-ranking member (immediately below Teng) on the new secretariat.

8. There are three full members of the politburo--Chen Yun, Li Fu-chun and Chen I-- and one alternate member, Chang Wen-tien, whose records give as good grounds for aligning them with Chou En-lai as those of Teng and Peng do for aligning those two with Liu. Chen Yun was early associated with Chou, became a party leader under Mao, and was apparently closely associated with Mao and Liu until 1949. Since that time, however, he has seemed much closer to Chou, first as one of his deputy premiers and, since 1954, as senior deputy. Li Fu-chun, with a similar history, has had particularly close association with Chou in recent years as a vice premier and chairman of the state planning commission. Chang Kuo-tao is confident that Li is a follower of Chou, and has said that Liu Shao-chi used to dislike Li. Chen I also was early associated with Chou, then rose under Mao as a military leader and seemed to be Mao's protégé, but in recent years has again appeared close to Chou as a vice premier and Chou's principal utility man; [redacted] described Chen as Chou's closest friend. Chang Wen-tien has been associated with both Liu and Chou, but Liu is said (by Chang Kuo-tao) to have intensely disliked Chang, whereas in recent years Chang has been Chou's senior deputy in the ministry of foreign affairs. However, even if all four of these persons are indeed followers of Chou's, only one of them--Chen Yun--seems to be as important a figure as the two leaders--Teng Hsiao-ping and Peng Chen--tentatively aligned with Liu.

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9. It may be that Chen Yun, the party's foremost figure in economic matters, is himself a center of power, and that some if not all of the other leaders in economic matters at the politburo level are his followers. A good case could be made for aligning Li Fu-chun with Chen, as the two have worked closely for most of the past 20 years in the party's organization department (before Liu Shao-chi moved to the center), in an economic department of the party, in the Manchurian bureau, and in the major economic organs of the government. The careers of the other two economists among politburo members, Li Hsien-nien and Po I-po, have suggested closer association with Liu Shao-chi than with Chen Yun; but Po since 1949 and Li since 1954 have been important principally as the directors of economic organs under Chen Yun. In any case, it is perhaps incorrect to regard any group of economic leaders as an actual or potential center of power, in view of their lack of control over the party apparatus or police or military organs; they may constitute a center of influence rather than of power, as persons of great importance to the party but not of much consequence in a contest for the succession.
10. Politburo member Peng Te-huai seems to qualify as a center of power because of his apparent domination of the military establishment. He appears to have been almost entirely a protégé of Mao; Chang Kuo-tao reports him as having had poor or indifferent relations with all the other senior military leaders, and as having no close relations with political leaders. There is nothing in Peng's record since Chang's time to provide grounds for aligning Peng with anyone but Mao.
11. The only other politburo member who appears to be an actual or possible center of power is Kang Sheng, in that Kang may still have a major role in the party's secret police. Kang was reportedly aligned with the Comintern faction against Mao before 1935, but rose under Mao and for many years (until perhaps 1949) headed the party's social affairs (secret police) department. The director of this department has not been identified since 1949, and Kang may again be the or a director. As with Peng Te-huai, there is nothing in Kang's record which would make plausible an alignment of him with anyone except Mao. His current status is cloudy, as he was demoted at the eighth congress from full to alternate member of the politburo and has since appeared only to make a minor address at a propaganda conference.

12. There are four politburo members (three of them alternates) not discussed above who do not appear to be centers of power and cannot be aligned with any of those conjectured, but who might be major assets to any contender. Lo Jung-huan, long closely associated with Lin Piao, has long been concerned with political control of the military and may still supervise political work in the army, although he may--due to illness--have joined other oldtime leaders in posts of much prestige but little power. The Mongol Ulanfu appears to hold concurrently all of the top posts in Inner Mongolia (the only person to have such authority in a regional or provincial post since the purged Kao Kang); and, as vice premier, he may supervise the regime's work among minority nationalities. Lu Hsiang-i and Chen Po-ta, who have long been spokesmen for Mao, are director and senior deputy director of the party's propaganda department.
13. The old secretariat of the central committee exceeded its constitutional powers and became in effect the politburo's standing committee and the center of power in the party. At the eighth congress the five members of the old secretariat, plus Teng Hsiao-ping, became officially the standing committee of the politburo (see Paragraph 4). The new secretariat is expected to confine itself more closely to its constitutional role--a very important one--of attending to the daily work of the central committee--that is, transmitting politburo decisions to the central departments and regional organs, formulating measures for implementation of those decisions, and directing and co-ordinating the work of the party apparatus. The secretariat is directed in this work by the politburo's standing committee, probably in largest part by Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping (as Mao has seemed increasingly to delegate responsibility, Chou is very busy with the government, Chu Te is in all probability incompetent, and Chen Yun's duties appear to lie primarily in the government). In any case, the two ranking members of the secretariat are Teng Hsiao-ping and Peng Chen. It is evident that an alliance between Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping on the standing committee, and Teng again and Peng Chen on the secretariat, would constitute a formidable combination in any struggle for power. The ten members of the secretariat seem well qualified by background, and well placed in other party and government posts, for their various duties. Teng Hsiao-ping's background--as a longtime political officer, a regional party chief, and more recently an organization specialist at the center (while concurrently a vice premier) is the model for members of the secretariat.

Seven of the other nine members have a background similar to Teng's. These are: Peng Chen, concurrently vice-chairman and secretary-general of the NPC standing committee under Liu Shao-chi; Tan Chen-lin, who may have concurrently a post in one of the party's major central departments; Tan Cheng, concurrently deputy minister of defense and director of the PLA's political department; Huang Ko-cheng, apparently much more a military man than the others, concurrently senior deputy minister of defense; Li Hsueh-feng, concurrently director of the party's industrial work department; Liu Lan-tao, concurrently senior deputy director of the party's control commission; and Yang Shang-kun, concurrently director of the CCP central committee's general office. Wang Chia-hsiang's background is similar in part, as he has had some concern with political control of the military in the past and was once a member of the secretariat, but in recent years Wang has been more concerned with propaganda and foreign affairs; he is concurrently a deputy foreign minister and active in liaison with other Communist parties. Hu Chiao-mu, with a background entirely in propaganda work, is deputy director of the party's propaganda department. Some of the first seven persons named have probably been directing the party's organization department since the fall of Jao Shu-shih in 1954. Two other important organs of the party--the social affairs (police) department and the rural work department--should logically be represented on the secretariat, which has connections with all other of the most important organs of the party and government. However, no member of the secretariat is known to be connected with the police, and none is known to have a background in agricultural work.

14. The two ranking members of the secretariat, Teng Hsiao-ping and Peng Chen, have been tentatively aligned with Liu Shao-chi (see Paragraph 7). Of the remaining eight full and alternate members, three--Tan Chen-lin, Liu Lan-tao and Yang Shang-kun--have been close to Teng Hsiao-ping in recent years as deputies to the secretary general. It is not known whether they retain these titles in the new secretariat. Two of the three, Liu and Yang, are said by Chang Kuo-tao to have been close to Liu Shao-chi in the past, whereas Tan apparently rose as a protégé of Mao's. Another member, Li Hsueh-feng, may owe his rise in part to Liu Shao-chi, but has been associated with many other leaders, including member Tan Cheng. Tan Cheng began as a protégé of Mao, but in recent years has seemed closest to politburo member Lo Jung-huan. Wang Chia-hsiang, for several years Tan Cheng's boss in the PLA's political department, in recent years has been closely

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associated with Chou En-lai as a deputy minister of foreign affairs. Huang Ko-cheng has long been associated with Peng Te-huai (as well as Lin Piao), and may be Peng's protégé. Hu Chiao-mu has seemed entirely a protégé of Mao. In any case, the influence of Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping seems to be more in evidence in the secretariat than that of any other persons.

15. The Chinese Communists have not made clear the relationship between the post of secretary general of the central committee, a post held by Teng Hsiao-ping, and the new secretariat of which Teng is the ranking member. As noted above, three of the five deputy secretaries general as of fall 1956--Tan Chen-lin, Liu Lan-tao and Yang Shang-kun--are included in the new secretariat, with or without their former titles. A fourth, Ma Ming-fang, is a deputy director of the organization department and a member of the party's control commission. The fifth, Sung Jen-chiung, is perhaps the best possibility to be still a deputy secretary general (and perhaps the only one), as he was identified as such during the eighth congress and is the only one of the former five not known to have any other major post in the party. Ma's past posts as a regional leader and current posts at the center of the apparatus suggest that he has been a protégé of both Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping. Sung has been a lieutenant of Teng Hsiao-ping's for many years. Thus all five of these onetime deputy secretaries general appear to belong in a Liu Shao-chi/Teng Hsiao-ping/Peng Chen or a Liu/Teng grouping, which might be designated an "organizational" group.
16. Among the central committee's central departments and committees, the body with the largest known membership and most imposing title, the central control commission, appears to be of comparatively little importance. Headed by old Tung Pi-wu, it is a disciplinary organ to "examine and deal with" individual violations of the constitution, party discipline and ethics, and state laws. The commission is not empowered, however, to take action against members of the CCP central committee, who occupy most key positions in the party and government. The commission includes only a few persons of significance, and in most cases the importance of these persons appears to derive not from their posts on the commission but from their other posts: Liu Lan-tao of the secretariat, Hsiao Hua of the PLA's major departments, minister of supervision Chien Ying, Ma Ming-fang of the party's organization department, and procurator-general Chang Ting-cheng. The concurrent posts of the members of this

commission connect it with the party politburo and secretariat, some of the party's central departments, and various government organs with related responsibilities, such as the supreme court and procuratorate, the political and cadres departments of the PLA, and the ministry of supervision. No one hand or combination of hands is apparent in appointments to this body.

17. The current status of the party's organization department is uncertain. It is believed to have once been the most powerful of the central departments, with control over the assignments and discipline of all party personnel except the top leadership. The importance of this department in the past is reflected in the current composition of the party politburo. Of the 11 full members of the politburo still regarded as major figures, seven are known or believed to have directed the work of this department at some time in their careers--Mao, Chou, Chen Yun and Li Fu-chun, all before 1946, and Liu, Teng Hsiao-ping and Peng Chen in recent years. The organization department was presumably shaken by the purge in 1954 of its then director, Jao Shu-shih, and some of its major functions may have been transferred to the secretariat (as in the Soviet party and some others) or to other central organs. The only officers of this department identified in the past two years are deputy directors Ma Ming-fang (June 1956) and An Tzu-wen (November 1955). Three of the leading suspects for the post of director of the organization department are members of the secretariat: Teng, Peng, and Tan Chen-lin. The other two current suspects are the two deputies, Ma and An, either of whom might have been elevated. All five of these persons are regarded as belonging in an "organizational" grouping around Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping.
18. The propaganda department has long been accepted as the core of party activity in the realm of information, education, indoctrination and cultural work, including the interpretation of doctrinal pronouncements by party leaders. This department shows Mao Tse-tung's hand more clearly than that of anyone else. The department's director, Lu Ting-i, and two of the deputy directors, Chen Po-ta and Hu Chiao-mu, have been spokesmen for Mao and apparently his protégés for many years. A fourth deputy, Chang Chi-chun, has long been a lieutenant of Teng Hsiao-ping. The fifth, Chou Yang, cannot be aligned with anyone.
19. The united front work department is generally believed to have had important functions in the past as a link between the

CCP and the many groups of the "united front," and perhaps as an intelligence-gathering body. This department is still very active, but it cannot be regarded as having anything like the importance of the organization, social affairs (police) or propaganda departments. There is no apparent pattern of alignments among the senior personnel of this department. Director Li Wei-han has been associated with many party leaders, perhaps most amiably with Chou En-lai. Two of the deputy directors, Chang Chih-i and Hsu Ti-hsin, appear to be Li's own protégés, and are in the state council's eighth staff office which Li heads and which has a similar area of concern. One deputy, Liao Cheng-chih, may be a protégé of Liu Shao-chi, and another, Hsu Ping, may be a protégé of Chou En-lai. The records of the other four deputies do not support even a conjecture.

20. The rural work department of the central committee has apparently been concerned with helping to formulate the party's agricultural policy and to supervise its implementation. Teng Tzu-hui is still the director of this department, despite his statement that he had been partly responsible for the conservative line in socialization of agriculture which was personally reversed by Mao in 1955. Teng's known deputies are Liao Lu-yen and Chen Cheng-jen. Sometimes reported as a deputy is Chen Po-ta, Mao's spokesman in the 1955 turnabout, although this would be a unique instance of a politburo member in a party post subordinate to a nonmember. Teng, associated with most of the party's top leaders at one time or another, has been regarded as Mao's own choice to head the rural work department. However, Teng would seem to have grounds for resenting his role as the scapegoat in the 1955 affair and his failure to be elevated to the politburo in 1956, as his line on the speed of socialization did not differ greatly from that of other party leaders who went on record, and, in fact, was closer to Mao's final line than were statements by many others (notably Liu Shao-chi). Chen Po-ta (see Paragraph 18) and Chen Cheng-jen have both seemed to be Mao's protégés. Liao Lu-yen seems to be Teng's own protégé. Both Chen Cheng-jen and Liao have been with Teng for years, in the rural work department and in the state council's seventh staff office (agriculture and conservation).
21. The industrial work department apparently directs and supervises some part of the work of party organs in state-owned industrial enterprises; the scope of its authority is not clear, and it is not known whether this department has any role in formulating policy. This department's director, Li Hsueh-feng, a member of the secretariat, has a background of organizational work and of association with party leaders such

as Lo Jung-huan (Politburo), Tan Cheng (Secretariat) and Teng Tzu-hui (rural work department), but cannot be aligned with anyone. His only known deputy is Li Li-san, whose allegiance may be still primarily to the USSR rather than to Mao or other party leaders, but Li now seems significant mainly as an object lesson.

22. The social affairs department has been generally accepted as the party police, with its most important function being that of checking the loyalty and security of party members. Various other functions attributed to it, but which have not been confirmed in recent years, include those of directing the operations of the Ministry of Public Security and of security units in other ministries, directing counter-intelligence in the armed forces, ensuring the security of communications, safeguarding leaders and documents, and undertaking covert intelligence abroad. The status of this department under Mao has seemed to differ from that of the NKVD/MGB under Stalin, as the police has not appeared to be used as the instrument of one man to consolidate his personal position. However, because there has been no known challenge to Mao's position for many years, it is uncertain whether the police could have been so used if Mao had wished. In other words, it is not known whether the social affairs department is controlled by just two leaders, Mao and a trusted lieutenant (as in the USSR under Stalin, by Stalin and his hatchetman of the moment), or by a body of party leaders, e.g., the politburo standing committee or secretariat. In either case, the possibility exists that the social affairs department could be brought into the service of one faction in a struggle for power after Mao's death or retirement, and would be of great importance. Kang Sheng (see paragraph 11) was succeeded as the director of this department, sometime before 1949, by Li Ko-nung, for some years his deputy. Li ranks above Kang in the current central committee list, and may now be a figure of greater importance than Kang.

Li's only known post is as a deputy chief of the PLA general staff, where he may play a major role in ensuring party control of the military; he may have this post concurrently with a post in the social affairs department. Kang cannot plausibly be aligned with anyone except Mao, and there are conflicting reports on Li.

Li is known to have worked closely with

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Kang Sheng for many years. Several other persons have been reported as leading officials of the social affairs department, including Chen Lung, Chou Hsing and Wang Tung-hsing; all three are deputies to Lo Jui-ching in the ministry of public security, which has seemed to be involved with the social affairs department at all levels (at some of the lower levels a single individual has been identified as handling both jobs). The cloudiness of the entire picture of the social affairs department is a severe handicap in any attempt to assess the structure of power in the CCP.

23. None of the other central organs of the central committee has been identified as a department, although some of them may be as important as certain of the departments. The committees known to be active are: the woman's work committee under Tsai Chang (Mrs. Li Fu-chun), and Teng Ying-chao (Mrs. Chou En-lai), who also head the largest mass organization for women and carry out much of the committee's work through it; the central state organs committee, apparently directing and co-ordinating some part of the work of party cells in central government organs; and the committee for organs directly subordinate to the CCP central committee, with similar responsibilities with respect to the party apparatus. The women's work committee is of uncertain importance, and the functions are unclear and the personnel unknown of the other two, which have only recently been identified. There may or may not be additional committees for some aspect of work among the military, for youth work, for national construction, for liaison with other Communist parties, and for other affairs. The senior party school under Yang Hsien-cheng (a little-known figure) and the headquarters of the Young Communist League under Hu Yao-pang (possibly a protégé of Liu Shao-chi) should probably be regarded as additional organs of the central committee.

24. There are several Chinese Communist leaders who have held important regional posts and may now be working in the central organs of the party, and some who have been reported by the Peiping press as working in central organs which have not yet been identified. These include: Ouyang Chin, a full member of the central committee, onetime secretary of the Heilungkiang committee and possibly a Liu/Teng/Peng protégé; Chiang Wei-ching, an alternate member of the central committee and onetime secretary of the Kiangsu committee; Pan Fu-sheng, an alternate member of the central committee and onetime secretary of the Pingyuan committee and, possibly, of the Honan committee; Chang Pan-shih, onetime deputy secretary of the

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North China bureau; Chang Tzu-i, long associated with Teng Hsiao-ping; Hsi Fu-jen, onetime organization director in the Inner Mongolian subbureau; Li Chang-ching, onetime secretary of the Sungkiang committee; Li Cho-jan, long with Kao Kang in the Northeast, who apparently survived Kao's fall; Li Meng-ling, onetime secretary of the Kirin committee; Wang Kuo-chuan, onetime secretary of the Jehol committee; Chao I-min, with a background in propaganda work, possibly now with the propaganda department; and Li Chi-hsin, a labor leader.

25. The structure of power in the government is probably of much less importance than the structure of power in the party. All major policies of the government are believed to originate in the party politburo or its standing committee, the government is designed as an instrument of the party's will, and the reliability of this instrument seems to be assured by the installation of party leaders in almost all key posts, by the interlocking of party organs with the state machinery, and by the work of party cells--transmission, interpretation, supervision--in all parts of the government. However, the importance of some Chinese Communist leaders (e.g., Chou En-lai, Chen Yun, Peng Te-huai) appears to derive primarily from their roles in the government rather than in the party; in other words, it is believed that their influence in party councils is based mainly on their skill and prestige as operators of the government machinery, and that their personal followings have largely been acquired in the years of such operation. Moreover, the possibility is not dismissed that a leader of some critical part of the government machinery (e.g., Peng Te-huai as minister of defense or Lo Jui-ching as minister of public security) could make common cause with the directors of certain party organs and bring the weight of his sector to bear in a struggle for the succession. Finally, relationships among officials of the government illuminate relations among those who are concurrently party leaders, including those (e.g., Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping, Peng Chen) whose importance derives largely or almost entirely from their roles in the party organization.
26. The chairman (Mao) of the People's Republic of China has broad appointive and executive powers, but most of these are procedural and require concurrence by the National People's Congress (meeting annually) or its standing committee. The chairman has power to convene the Supreme State Conference (of government leaders) and the National Defense Council (of military leaders), but the former appears to be simply a vehicle for making policy decisions public and the latter

seems at most an advisory body. The chairman does not control the machinery of government, i.e., the NPC standing committee, the State Council (the center of government power), and the ministries and commissions. The office of chairman is thus one of much prestige but little power, and will be of no importance if vice-chairman Chu Te succeeds Mao in it. Mao's staff office director as of 1955, Chang Ching-wu, may or may not still have this post concurrently with his post in Tibet; no successor has been identified in either post.

27. The NPC standing committee (79 persons), a body similar to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in the USSR, "jointly exercises" with the PRC chairman the powers and functions of the head of state. It is empowered to interpret laws, issue decrees, ratify treaties, declare war, proclaim martial law and order mobilization. It appoints or removes, on the premier's recommendation, vice premiers, ministers and heads of commissions, and has the power to appoint or dismiss on its own initiative a number of other government officials of lesser importance. It is also empowered to "supervise" the State Council and to annul decisions of the State Council and its subordinate bodies which contravene the Constitution, laws and decrees. The NPC standing committee (meeting about twice a month) has in fact been exercising its formal powers. However, its legislative activity has appeared to follow previous action by the State Council, and there is no clear instance in which the standing committee has exercised its veto power over the State Council. Moreover, its important personnel actions have almost certainly been determined by those party organs concerned with assignments. In sum, the NPC standing committee is potentially an important body which could come into collision with the State Council, but it has not seemed important to date and there is no good evidence of conflict.
28. Whereas two politburo members (Mao and Chu) are chairman and vice chairman of the regime, three others occupy top posts in the NPC standing committee. Liu Shao-chi is the chairman, and Peng Chen, tentatively aligned with Liu, is a vice chairman and the secretary general. Lo Jung-huan, aligned with Mao, is also a vice chairman. Another vice chairman is Li Wei-han, not a politburo member, who may be closest to Chou En-lai. The other two Communist vice chairman need not be considered, as Lin Po-chu is too old and Sai Fu-ting is almost always at his post in Sinkiang.

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29. The NPC standing committee also supervises the work of two much less important bodies than the State Council, these being the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate. As the regime does not operate on the principle of separation of powers, the court is merely an arm of the administration, handling serious criminal and civil cases and (with the Ministry of Justice) directing and supervising the work of lesser courts. The current president of the court is politburo member Tung Pi-wu, an old comrade of Mao who has a similar post of some prestige but probably slight importance as head of the party's control commission. The procuratorate may be of somewhat greater significance than the court, as it has supervisory jurisdiction over government organs and personnel below the level of the State Council, and works with the ministries of Public Security and Supervision in the "suppression of counterrevolutionaries" and the prosecution of erring officials. The chief procurator is central committee member Chang Ting-cheng, who apparently began as a protégé of Mao but has been more closely associated with other party leaders such as Tan Chen-lin and Teng Tzu-hui.
30. The principal organ of the government has clearly been Chou En-lai's State Council (cabinet), the "highest administrative organ of the state," a body similar to the USSR's Council of Ministers. It drafts laws for the NPC standing committee to approve, it formulates administrative measures and issues administrative decisions and decrees, and directs and co-ordinates the work of 50 ministries and commissions as well as all local governments. The State Council is composed of the premier (Chou), named by the PRC chairman and appointed by the NPC standing committee (which cannot remove the premier); the vice premiers (currently 12, 10 of them politburo members) and the secretary general, all nominated by the premier and appointed (and removed) by the NPC standing committee; and the ministers and heads of commissions, all nominated by the premier and appointed (and removed) by the NPC standing committee. This body is supposed to meet in plenary session once a month. However, there is a sort of standing committee or "inner cabinet" comprised of Chou and his 12 vice premiers and possibly the secretary general, which is probably in session much of the time, although not at full strength, as some members are absent much or most of the time.
31. It seems almost certain that Chou En-lai has not decided unilaterally upon his vice premiers, but that these appointments instead represent decisions by the party politburo

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or its standing committee, with Chou as one member. Chou's 12 vice premiers include 10 politburo members not otherwise provided for in the top posts in the chairman's office, the NPC standing committee, and the Supreme Court. (The politburo has thus far failed to place in top government posts only one regular member, Liu Po-cheng, and four alternates, Chang Wen-tien, Lu Ting-i, Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng.) This "inner cabinet" is comprised of: senior vice premier Chen Yun, the top economic co-ordinator and perhaps the nearest thing to Chou as a general talent in government operations; Teng Hsiao-ping, presumably concerned with the party organization in the government; Peng Te-huai, the regime's top military man; Li Fu-chun and Po I-po, the principal economic planners; Li Hsien-nien, in recent years a specialist in finance and trade; Teng Tzu-hui (non-politburo), a specialist in agriculture; Chen I, a utility man for Chou in foreign affairs; Ulanfu, who spends much of his time in Inner Mongolia; and, as less important figures, Lin Piao, sick and out of Peiping, Ho Lung and Nieh Jung-chen (the latter non-politburo), who seem to be used for small jobs, and possibly Secretary General Hsi Chung-hsun (neither a politburo member nor a vice premier), who seems to be a housekeeper. The nine important figures of the "inner cabinet" (in addition to Chou) have been discussed in Paragraphs 7-12; Chen Yun, Li Fu-chun and Chen I have been tentatively aligned with Chou En-lai, Teng Hsiao-ping with Liu Shao-chi, Peng Te-huai with his own "military" group, and Li Hsien-nien, Po I-po, Teng Tzu-hui and Ulanfu with no one.

32. The premier, vice premiers and secretary general work through the premier's office, the secretariat and eight staff offices. The premier's office and secretariat, headed by minor figures, protégés of Chou and Hsi Chung-hsun, are responsible for various aspects of administration and perhaps for liaison with provincial and local governments. The more important staff offices, two headed by politburo members and the other six by full members of the central committee, direct and co-ordinate the work of 40 of the 42 ministries and possibly some of the eight commissions, and link the government machinery with the appropriate central departments of the party. The known or apparent areas of concern of the staff offices, and their directors, are: first, internal security and related judicial matters, lo Jui-ching; second, education and culture, Lin Feng; third, heavy industry, Po I-po; fourth, labor and light industry, Chia To-fu; fifth, finance, currency and trade, Li Hsien-nien; sixth, transport and communications, Wang Shou-tao; seventh, agriculture and

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conservation, Teng Tzu-hui; and eighth, miscellaneous affairs, Li Wei-han. Just as it seems almost certain that Chou does not unilaterally decide upon his vice premiers, so it seems doubtful that Chou alone selects the directors of staff offices. However, Chou may well have a larger voice than any one else in appointments to the staff offices. Four of these eight directors have been discussed earlier: Po I-po, Li Hsien-nien and Teng Tzu-hui cannot be aligned with anyone, whereas Li Wei-han (director of the united front work department) has perhaps been closest to Chou En-lai. As for the other four: Lo Jui-ching, who is also minister of public security and commander and political officer of public security forces in the PLA, has seemed to be a Mao protégé throughout his career, but may also have close connections with party police figures such as Kang Sheng and Li Ko-nung; Lin Feng, who has no known major post in the party at this time, has a background as a regional leader and organizational specialist which would justify a tentative alignment of Lin with Liu Shao-chi and/ or Peng Chen; both Chia To-fu and Wang Shou-tao have apparently been associated with Liu Shao-chi during their careers, but neither can be aligned with him or any other leader. The known deputy directors of these eight staff offices seem in all cases to be party leaders of less importance than the directors, although further information may not support that view. These deputies in some cases, particularly in the third, seventh and eighth staff offices, seem to be protégés of the directors.

33. Lo Jui-ching's first staff office directs the work of the ministries of Public Security, Supervision, Justice, and Interior. Much of the most important of these is the Ministry of Public Security, an overt police agency headed by Lo himself, which is the center of the nation-wide police system reaching down to the village and bloc, and which also controls penal labor. The work of the staff office and of this key ministry is almost certainly co-ordinated with the work of the social affairs (covert police) department of the party. Lo's senior deputy in the staff office, Wu Tefeng, has spent much of his career with the social affairs department, and five of Lo's eight deputies in the ministry (Chen Lung, Chou Hsing, Wang Tung-hsing, Hsu Chien-kuo and Wang Chin-hsiang) have reportedly worked in that department in the past. Some of these persons probably have posts in the social affairs department concurrently. The staff office and ministry may work with the party's organization department as well. Another deputy in the staff office, Chu Chi-wen, has a background primarily in organizational work; the background of the third deputy, Chang Chih-hsing, is not known.

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The Ministry of Supervision, under central committee member Chien Ying (a woman), inspects the efficiency and probity of government organs and personnel; Chien is concurrently a member of the party's control commission. The Ministry of Justice, nominally under a non-Communist female, supervises judicial departments of provincial and local governments and is involved in action against "counterrevolutionaries" and nonpolitical offenders. The real director of this ministry is probably deputy minister Chen Yang-shan, who has a background in public security work. The Ministry of Interior, nominally headed by party elder Hsieh Chueh-tsai, now 76, has been concerned with veterans' affairs, disaster relief, mobilization of labor for public works, and various lesser matters. As noted above, Lo Jui-ching has apparently been a Mao protégé but may be close to some of the secret police leaders, as may be Wu Te-feng of the staff office and some of Lo's deputies in the ministry. Neither Chien Ying nor Chen Yang-shan can be aligned, and the real director of the Ministry of Interior is not known.

34. Lin Feng's second staff office directs the work of the ministries of Culture, Education, Higher Education and Public Health, as well as the regime's official news agency and the broadcasting bureau, and perhaps the physical culture and sports commission. The Ministry of Culture, the governmental counterpart of the party's propaganda department, is nominally headed by a non-Communist; which of his deputies is the real director is not known. The same is true of the Ministry of Education. This ministry and the Ministry of Higher Education, under central committee member Yang Hsiu-feng, between them exercise governmental controls over the entire educational system. The Ministry of Higher Education appears also to control the assignments of college graduates, and presumably works closely with the bureau (once ministry) of personnel, which recruits and trains government personnel and may be subordinate to this second staff office. The Ministry of Public Health, nominally headed by a non-Communist woman, plans and directs programs to improve health, sanitation and medical facilities, and to promote birth control; the real directors of the ministry are unknown. The physical culture and sports commission, under politburo member Ho Lung, seems concerned merely with popularizing athletics. Lin Feng, director of the staff office, has a background primarily in organizational and secondarily in propaganda work, and may belong in the Liu/Teng/Peng "organizational" group. His three deputies, Chien Chun-jui, Fan Chang-chiang and Chang Chia-fu, have been primarily propagandists, although Chien

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and Minister of Higher Education Yang Hsiu-feng have had some experience in educational work; none of these four persons can be aligned.

35. Politburo member Po I-Po's third staff office--concerned with heavy industry--appears to have the greatest responsibilities, directing and co-ordinating the work of at least 10 and perhaps 12 major ministries. The three ministries of machine building are headed by full members of the central committee: Huang Ching, Chao Erh-lu and Sung Jen-chiung, who have no known major posts in the party at this time, although Huang is concurrently chairman of the national technological commission and Sung may still be a deputy secretary general of the central committee. The first of these ministries is responsible for production of machines and machine tools, and probably ships, automobiles and locomotives; the second is concerned with arsenals, aircraft and possibly naval vessels; the third, reactivated last fall, may handle local machinery and power equipment industries which are not yet fully socialized, or may instead be concerned with small electrical equipment (consumer goods such as household appliances). The ministries of Power Equipment Industry and Electric Power Industry, headed by central committee alternate members Chang Lin-chih and Liu Lan-po, appear to be responsible respectively for plants making power and medical equipment and for the construction of power facilities and the operation of certain power transmission networks. (A State Council directive of 1955 indicated that the Ministry of Electric Power Industry was subordinate to the sixth staff office, and it may be still; however, it is believed that the lines of command change, and this ministry seems to fit better under this third staff office). The Ministry of Metallurgical Industry, under central committee alternate member Wang Ho-shou, concurrently chairman of the national construction commission, has bureaus concerned with ferrous and nonferrous metals, with a special bureau for the Anshan complex in Manchuria; this ministry may be responsible for extraction of ferrous and nonferrous minerals. The Ministry of Geology, nominally headed by non-Communist Li Ssu-kuang (perhaps really headed by deputy minister Liu Chieh, who is a deputy director of this third staff office), conducts long-range surveys and guides the short-range surveys of individual ministries, but probably does not handle the actual exploitation of resources. The Ministries of Petroleum Industry and Coal Industry, headed respectively by Li Chu-kuei and central committee member Chen Yu, are responsible for the production of oil and coal. The Ministry of Building Materials Industry, under Lai Chi-fa, is responsible for the production

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of construction materials, e.g., cement, brick, tile, clay, sand, but does not engage in construction. The Ministry of Building Construction, under Liu Hsiu-feng, builds both "non-productive" buildings (e.g., schools, housing, hospitals) and factory and office buildings. The Ministry of City Construction (which may or may not be subordinate to this third staff office), under Wan Li, is responsible for urban surveying and planning, and perhaps for construction of some "non-productive" buildings. Po I-po himself (see paragraphs 31-32) cannot be aligned with any other top-level leader. Two of Po's deputies in this staff office, Sun Chih-yuan and Ku Mu, look to be protégés of Po; the other Liu Chieh, is little known. Two ministers, Huang Ching and Liu Hsiu-feng, may be protégés of Po. Sun Jen-chiung, as previously noted, has long been a lieutenant of Teng Hsiao-ping, and Chang Lin-chih may also be a Teng protégé. Liu Lan-po and Wang Ho-shou have been associated with both Peng Chen and Li Fu-chun (aligned above with different groups), and Wang could equally well be another protégé of Po I-po. Chao Erh-lu, with a mixed military and political background, Chen Yu, a longtime labor leader, and Li Chu-kuei, Lai Chi-fa, and Wan Li, who are not well known, cannot plausibly be aligned with anyone.

36. Chia To-fu's fourth staff office, concerned with labor and light industry, seems much less important than the third staff office. It directs the work of four or five ministries. The Ministry of Labor, under central committee alternate member Ma Wen-jui, may be the center of government controls over the labor force. It is concerned with labor union affairs and labor legislation, as well as allocation of manpower. It works closely with (and may be less important than) the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (15,000,000 members) headed by central committee members Lai Jo-yu and Liu Ning-i. The Ministry of Light Industry, under non-Communist Sha Chien-li, who succeeded Chia To-fu in this post last year, is concerned with the production of sugar, salt, paper, tobacco, pharmaceuticals and other consumer goods. The Ministry of Textile Industry, under non-Communist Chiang Kuang-nai, handles the production of textiles. The Ministry of Chemical Industry (the subordination of which is uncertain), under Peng Tao, is concerned with rubber, chemical fertilizers, and probably some industrial chemicals. The Ministry of Food Industry (subordination also uncertain), under non-Communist Li Chu-chien, may be responsible for industrial processing of food, e.g., canning and packing. Neither Chia To-fu, nor either of his deputies in this fourth staff office, Sung Shao-wen and Chou Kuang-chun, can be aligned with anyone. Of the ministers,

Peng Tao was associated with Teng Hsiao-ping in the south-west. The allegiance of the leaders of the ACFTU is also unclear.

37. Politburo member Li Hsien-nien's fifth staff office is concerned with three major ministries and two or three of lesser importance. The Ministry of Finance, headed by Li himself, is responsible for the budget, collection of taxes, inspection and auditing and the national treasury. The Ministry of Commerce is currently headed by politburo member and senior Vice Premier Chen Yun (central committee member Tseng Shan, a deputy director of this fifth staff office, apparently was unsatisfactory as minister of commerce), and therefore is probably not subordinate to this staff office at this time; it handles domestic trade, supervises state trading companies, and plans and supervises market arrangements. The Ministry of Foreign Trade, under central committee member Yeh Chi-chuang --also a deputy director of this staff office--is responsible for the administration and control of foreign trade and of customs. The Ministries of Agricultural Produce Procurement and of City Services (which may or may not be subordinated to this fifth staff office) are both headed by Yang I-chen; the former is concerned with the purchase of agricultural commodities for industry (e.g., cotton, jute, tea), and the latter with control of the food supply in cities and for restaurants and messes. The Ministry of Food, under non-Communist Chang Nai-chi, is responsible for procurement (including advance purchase) of grain and edible oils, and has handled some food distribution. Li Hsien-nien himself (see paragraphs 31-32) cannot be aligned with anyone; neither can Tseng Shan or Yeh Chi-chuang be aligned; nor can Niu Pei-tsung or Tuan Yun, Li's other two deputies in this fifth staff office. Yang I-chen, whose background is mainly in party organizational work, might be aligned with an "organizational" group.
38. Wang Shou-tao's sixth staff office directs the work of the Ministry of Railways, the Ministry of Communications (highways, ports, harbors, inland waterways), and the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications. Wang Shou-tao himself (see paragraph 32) has had so many different kinds of party and government posts that it is not possible to align him with anyone; Wang's two deputies in this staff office, Kuo Hung-tao and Chang Kuo-chien, are little known. The minister of railways, Teng Tai-yuan, might be tentatively aligned with Peng Te-huai, with whom he has long been associated. The Ministries of Communications and of Posts and Telecommunications are headed nominally by non-Communists; the work of the former may be

directed by deputy minister Li Yun-chang, who may belong with the "organizational" group, but there is no way to judge which of the Communist deputies in the other ministry may be the real director.

39. Teng Tzu-hui's seventh staff office directs the work of the important Ministry of Agriculture and four or five others of lesser importance, the ministries of Water Conservancy, Timber Industry, Land Reclamation, Forestry, and (possibly) Marine Products. Teng Tzu-hui (see paragraph 20), the logical man to head this staff office in view of his concurrent post as director of the party's rural work department, cannot be aligned with any of the top handful of leaders. The three most important of Teng's deputies in this staff office--Liao Lu-yen, Chen Chen-jen and Tu Jun-sheng, the first two of whom are among Teng's deputies in the rural work department--appear to be protégés of Teng's. The other two deputies in this seventh staff office, Li Teng-ying and Tao Han-fu, are little known. Liao Lu-yen is minister of agriculture concurrently with his posts in the rural work department and this staff office. The minister of land reclamation is central committee member Wang Chen, who is concurrently commander of the PLA's railway corps but is also qualified for the reclamation post, and who has been closely associated with Peng Te-huai. The other four ministries in this group are nominally headed by non-Communists. Power in the Ministry of Water Conservancy probably is in the hands of Li Pao-hua, a central committee member who may belong to the "organizational" group. The real director of the Ministry of Marine Products is probably Kao Wen-hua, who cannot be aligned. The effective deputies in the other two ministries of this group are not known.

40. The designation and scope of Li Wei-han's eighth staff office are not clear. Peiping has referred to it as the "state capitalism" office, and has publicly subordinated to it no ministry or commission and no office of more importance than the central industrial and commercial administrative control bureau. This staff office is believed to be concerned, however, with liaison and co-ordination with all non-Communist groups represented in the "united front," and as such should supervise two of the commissions, those of nationalities affairs and Overseas Chinese affairs. Li Wei-han himself (see paragraph 19) has been tentatively aligned with Chou En-lai. Two of Li's deputies in this staff office, Chang Chih-i and Hsu Ti-hsin, are among his deputies in the party's united front work department as well, and appear to be his protégés. The third deputy in this staff office, Sun

Chi-meng, is little known. The nationalities affairs commission is headed by Ulanfu (see paragraph 12), but, in view of his posts in Inner Mongolia, his role in the work of this commission is not clear. It may be directed by some combination of deputy chairman, such as Wang Feng and Chang Chih-i, both concurrently deputy directors of the united front work department, Liu Chua, an apparent protégé of Ulanfu, and Wei Kuo-ching, an alternate member of the central committee. The nominal chairman of the Overseas Chinese affairs commission is an old lady (79). The real directors of this commission are probably deputy chairman Liao Cheng-chih (see paragraph 19), possibly a protégé of Liu Shao-chi, and Fang Fang, who may belong in the "organizational" group.

41. The four economic commissions and one scientific commission subordinate to the State Council appear to be quasi-independent special-purpose bodies which cut across the lines of responsibility and the functions of the staff offices. The state planning commission, for example, clearly must draw upon all of the economic staff offices and ministries. These five commissions, all of which have planning functions, are believed to be directly subordinate to the State Council rather than operated through the staff offices. The state planning commission, headed by politburo member and Vice Premier Li Fu-chun, has the heavy responsibility of long-range economic planning (principally the five-year plans). The national economic commission, headed by politburo alternate member and Vice Premier Po I-po, has the considerable responsibility of annual economic planning, including supervision of execution of this planning. The national technological commission, under central committee member Huang Ching (see paragraph 35), who is concurrently head of the First Ministry of Machine Building, is responsible for raising Communist China's industrial technological level by selecting and promoting new techniques and formulating long-range plans for technological development. The national construction commission, under central committee alternate member Wang Ho-shou (see paragraph 35), who is concurrently minister of metallurgical industry, is (or was) responsible for co-ordinating the construction plans and activities of all industrial ministries and the Ministry of Building Construction. The new scientific planning commission, headed (perhaps nominally) by central committee member and Vice Premier Nieh Jung-chen, who has no known qualifications for this post, is presumably concerned with developing the regime's scientific establishment, which is not impressive. These five commissions probably do not work together as a unit, and there does not appear to be any common allegiance among their chairmen and deputies. Chairman Li

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Fu-chun of the state planning commission has been aligned with Chou En-lai. Two of his deputies, Chang Hsi and Peng Tao, may belong with the "organizational" group. Three others, Ku Cho-hsin, Yang Ying-chieh and Wang Kuang-wei, may be protégés either of Li Fu-chun or of "organizational" figures. The other two deputies, Hsueh Mu-chiao and Lo Keng-mo, cannot be aligned. Chairman Po I-po of the national economic commission cannot be aligned. Of the nine deputy chairman, at least two, Sun Chih-yuan and Ku Mu, concurrently deputy directors of the third staff under Po, seem to be protégés of Po; Chia To-fu and Sung Shao-wen, concurrently director and deputy director of the fourth staff office, cannot be aligned; Han Che-i, Hsueh Tzu-cheng, Liu Tai-feng, Wang Hsin-san and Yeh Lin are little known. Chairman Huang Ching (see paragraph 35) of the national technological commission may be a protégé of Po I-po; Huang's deputies on this commission are not known. Chairman Wang Ho-shou (see paragraph 35) of the national construction commission cannot be aligned, nor can any of his five deputies, Wang Shih-tai, Kung Hsiang-chen, An Chih-wen, Li Pin and Liu Hsing. Chairman Nieh Jung-chen of the scientific planning commission is said (by Chang Kuo-tao) to have been close to Chou En-lai; Nieh's deputies, perhaps more important figures than Nieh, are not known.

42. One of the two ministries not subordinate to any staff office is Chou En-lai's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Chou in this post is subordinate to himself as premier, and the ministry seems to be Chou's own show. Chou's senior deputy is politburo alternate member Chang Wen-tien (see paragraph 8), who has appeared in recent years to be Chou's follower. The other deputies are central committee and secretariat member Wang Chia-hsiang (see paragraph 14), also aligned with Chou; central committee alternate member Chang Han-fu, who has seemed close only to Chou; and Chi Peng-fei, who, while perhaps not as close to Chou as the others, has not appeared to be closer to anyone else. Most of the lesser figures in the ministry--the assistants to the minister, and the heads of geographic and specialized divisions--have also appeared to be Chou's protégés. There may well be, among Chou's apparent lieutenants in this ministry, an "organizational" or police figure who compromises Chou's control of the ministry. Li Ko-nung (see paragraph 22) from 1949 to 1954 was a deputy minister of foreign affairs, in which post he was suspected of being a watchdog, but an assessment of Li's work in that post is complicated by Chang Kuo-tao's insistence that Li is close to Chou himself. One suspect for the watchdog's job in the ministry is Chou Tung, onetime (perhaps still) director of personnel, but Chou has not appeared in the news for several years.

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43. The Ministry of Defense is the only ministry except Foreign Affairs which is directly subordinate to the State Council. It has been conjectured (see paragraph 10) that Defense Minister Peng Te-huai, Peiping's only marshal known to be currently active as a military leader, should be regarded as a center of power. This is not to say that the military establishment is a distinct and separate political force, because the typical party controls over government--party leaders in key posts, interlocking organs, and party organs in government bodies--are reproduced in the military establishment. However, if Chou En-lai is to be regarded as a center of power by virtue primarily of his leading role in directing a civil bureaucracy of about 4,000,000 persons, then Peng Te-huai logically qualifies through his role in directing a military force of about 2,500,000 men. Political power in China probably still rests primarily, as it always has, on armed force. Peng is believed, like Marshal Zhukov in the USSR, to have authority over all the military activities, including operations, of all arms of the service. Moreover, whereas no one individual's hand is particularly evident in the selection of vice premiers, staff office directors, and heads of ministries and commissions, Peng's hand seems to show more clearly than that of any other party leader--and much more clearly than that of any other active military leader--in appointments to top posts in the military establishment.

44. Power in the military establishment is almost certainly centered in the Ministry of National Defense, rather than in the National Defense Council. The council, headed by the PRC chairman (Mao), convened by him, and responsible only to him, has among its vice chairmen the 10 marshals who are Communist China's best-known military names, but the body has no defined powers and is too mixed in composition (it includes many one-time Nationalist generals) to have any important unpublicized powers. Even its presumed advisory function would probably be in practice one of endorsing rather than advising. Since becoming minister of national defense in fall 1954, Marshal Peng Te-huai--whose relations with other senior generals are said by Chang Kuo-tao to have been not good in Chang's time--has been building his own team, and few of the other senior generals of the old days seem now to be on the team. Of Peng's seven or eight deputy ministers of defense, three or four have been closely associated with Peng. The figure in doubt is Senior General Chen Keng, the senior deputy chief of staff, who has been reported as a deputy minister of defense concurrently but has not been confirmed in this post by Chinese Communist sources. Chen was long associated with Liu Po-cheng, but before getting his current post or posts was Peng's deputy

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commander in the Korean war. Colonel General Huang Ko-cheng, concurrently a member of the party secretariat, spent his early career with Peng and his mid-career mostly with Lin Piao, and in recent years has been back with Peng. Colonel General Li Ta was also with Liu Po-cheng for some years, but then was Peng's chief of staff in Korea. Colonel General (?) Liao Han-sheng has spent almost all of his known career under Peng. Two other deputy ministers of defense, Senior Admiral Hsiao Ching-kuang, concurrently commander of the navy, and Colonel General (?) Wang Shu-sheng, have been close to Lin Piao, now out of the picture. Another deputy, Colonel General Hsiao Ko, has been closely associated with both Lin Piao and Ho Lung. The remaining deputy, Senior General Tan Cheng, concurrently a member of the party secretariat and director of the PLA's political department, is concerned with political control of the military; Tan (see paragraph 14) has appeared to be a protégé of Mao Tse-tung and, more recently, of Lo Jung-huan.

45. The PLA's general staff is presumed to get its general directives from the Ministry of Defense just as the ministry gets them from the State Council and the State Council from the party politburo or standing committee. The general staff, further presumed to be responsible for military planning and for operations, is headed by Senior General Su Yu, long associated with Chen I and perhaps mainly responsible for Chen's victories during the civil war. Su, not yet 50, seems a key figure; he cannot be aligned with anyone. Of Su's six deputies, four have been closely associated with Peng Te-huai: Senior General Chen Keng, perhaps concurrently deputy minister of defense (see paragraph 44), who once ranked Su Yu, although he was Su's deputy on the general staff; Colonel General Wang Chen, concurrently commander of the railway corps and minister of land reclamation; Colonel General Chang Tsung-shun, long Peng's deputy in the northwest; and Colonel General Peng Shao-hui, also with Peng in the northwest. A fifth deputy chief of staff, Colonel General Chang Ai-ping, looks to be Su Yu's own protégé. The sixth deputy, Li Ko-nung (see paragraph 22) does not seem to be a protégé of any military leader, and would not be expected to be, as Li's work on the general staff is very probably concerned with party control of the military. All of the persons known or believed to be concerned with party control of the military--such as Lo Jung-huan, Tan Cheng, Li Ko-nung--seem to belong with a nonmilitary group. It would perhaps be of much importance if any such persons could be reliably aligned with military leaders, as this would suggest a breach in party control of the military and the possibility of the detachment of some part of the military establishment as an effective separate force.

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46. No picture emerges from the PLA's major departments, all but one of which are presumed to be directed by the Ministry of National Defense and the general staff. As noted above, the political department--which under the party constitution is directly subordinate to the party's central committee and responsible for "ideological and organizational work" in the armed forces--is headed by Senior General Tan Cheng, a protégé of Mao, and closely associated with Lo Jung-huan. Tan's senior deputy, Colonel General Kan Szu-chi, has been long and apparently cordially associated with Peng Te-huai (he was Peng's political officer in Korea), and may conceivably prove an exception to the general rule that persons concerned with party control of the military should be aligned with political rather than military leaders. The PLA cadres department is headed by another apparent protégé of Mao Tse-tung, Colonel General Hsiao Hua, concurrently a deputy director of the political department. The current directors of the training and supervision departments are not known. The directors of the finance and rear services departments, Colonel General (?) Yu Chiu-li and Colonel General Hung Hsueh-chih, are little known, although Hung may have been with Peng Te-huai in Korea. Peiping has just identified a department of "general arms" or ordnance, under Colonel General Wang Shu-sheng (see paragraph 44), deputy minister of defense.

47. The importance of the major "headquarters" of the PLA cannot be assessed until it is discovered whether these are simply administrative headquarters, or are instead parts of the operational chain of command from the minister of defense and the general staff to the major commands. Moreover, the senior personnel of these headquarters are infrequently identified. Two of the two known headquarters are commanded by persons who have been associated with Peng Te-huai: the armored forces, by Colonel General (?) Hsu Kuang-ta; and the railway corps, by Colonel General Wang Chen (see paragraph 39). A third, air defense, is commanded by a person who has seemed close to Peng in recent years, Colonel General Yang Cheng-wu, who is also commander of the Peiping-Tientsin garrison and a figure of much interest on both counts, but Yang's background is not well enough known to justify aligning him with Peng. Artillery forces are commanded by Colonel General (?) Chen Hsi-lien, long associated with Liu Po-cheng. The engineers

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corps is commanded by a nephew of Chen I, Colonel General Chen Shih-chu. Public security forces are commanded by Lo Jul-ching (see paragraphs 32-33). Two of the headquarters--the air force and the navy--are commanded by persons long associated with Lin Piao, Colonel General Liu Ya-lou and Senior Admiral Hsiao Ching-kuang (see paragraph 44). The commanders of the signal corps, the possible medical corps, and the anti-chemical corps (or anti-atomic/bacteriological/chemical warfare corp or department) are not known.

48. Just as there are several Chinese Communist political figures known to have had important posts who cannot now be located, and others known to have important posts which cannot be precisely identified, so there are many Chinese Communist military leaders whose current assignments are unknown or unclear. Some of these are known to be working in Peiping, and others are probably with regional and operational commands outside Peiping. One, Hsu Hai-tung, is a full member of the central committee. Eight are alternate members of the central committee: Chung Chi-kuang, possibly in East China; Wan I, long with Lin Piao; Liao Han-sheng (see paragraph 44), a Peng Te-huai protégé and a deputy minister of defense, but never reported as being in Peiping; Sung Shih-lun, said to be a friend of commander of engineers Chen Shih-chu; Yang Te-chih, onetime commander of Chinese forces in Korea; Chen Chi-han, whose posts have been unreported since 1950; Chang Ta-chih, long associated with Peng Te-huai; and Chou Pao-chung, last identified in the southwest. Others are: Chou Shih-ti, onetime commander of air defense forces, long out of the news, possibly out of favor; Wang Cheng, believed to have directed the PLA's communications department; Chang Chung-han, one of Peng's deputies in the northwest; Wang Shang-jung, possibly director of operations for the general staff; Yen Kuei-yao, apparently a Peng protégé, with a post in the general staff; Mo Wen-hua, closely associated with Lin Piao; Chuang Tien, onetime associate of Chen Keng; Fu Chiu-tao, who recently appeared in Peiping; Wang Ping, long in Manchuria; Yang Hsiu-shan, recently a member of Teng Hua's military mission to Yugoslavia; Chao Pao-tung, onetime commander of air forces in the central-south regions; Liang Pi-yeh, a longtime political officer; and Teng Shao-tung, onetime deputy commander of public security forces. Establishment of the current status of these persons would assist in analysis of the structure of power and of alignments among key figures in that structure.

CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL ORGANS

CENTRAL COMMITTEE
 MAO TSE-TUNG, Ch.
 LIU SHAO-CHI, V-Ch.
 CHOU EN-LAI, V-Ch.
 CHU TE, V-Ch.
 CHEN YUN, V-Ch.
 TENG HSIAO-PING, Sec.

27 full members

73 alternate members

Names of POLITICAL members are capitalized on this chart.

Names of both full and alternate members of the CENTRAL COMMITTEE are preceded by a black dot.

POLITBURO
 MAO TSE-TUNG, Ch.
 LIU SHAO-CHI, V-Ch.
 CHOU EN-LAI, V-Ch.
 CHU TE, V-Ch.
 CHEN YUN, V-Ch.
 TENG HSIAO-PING

LIU SHAO-CHI
 LIN PO-CHU
 TUNG PI-WU
 PENG CHEN
 LO JUNG-HUAN
 CHEN I
 LI FU-CHUN
 PENG TE-HUAI
 LIU PO-CHENG
 PO LUNG
 LI HSIEN-NIEN
 ULANFU, Alt.
 CHANG WEN-TIEN, Alt.
 LU TING-I, Alt.
 CHEN PO-TA, Alt.
 KANG SHENG, Alt.
 PO I-PO, Alt.

POLITBURO STANDING COMMITTEE
 MAO TSE-TUNG
 LIU SHAO-CHI
 CHOU EN-LAI
 CHU TE
 CHEN YUN
 TENG HSIAO-PING

SECRETARIAT
 TENG HSIAO-PING
 PENG CHEN
 • Wang Chia-hsiang
 • Tan Chen-lin
 • Tan Cheng
 • Huang Ko-cheng
 • Li Hsiang-feng
 • Liu Lan-tao, Alt.
 • Yang Shang-kun, Alt.
 • Hu Chiao-mu, Alt.
 *concurrently director of Staff Office

SUPREME PEOPLES COURT
 TUNG PI-WU, Pres.


SUP. PROCURATORATE
 • Chang Tzu-cheng,
 Chief Procurator

STANDING COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS
 LIU SHAO-CHI, Ch.
 PENG CHEN, V-Ch. & S.
 LO JUNG-HUAN, V-Ch.
 LIN PO-CHU, V-Ch.
 LI Wei-han, V-Ch.
 Tsai Fu-tung, V-Ch.

PREMIER'S OFFICE
 Chu Yen-ming, Dir.


SECRETARIAT
 Chang Li-Fu

LI FU-CHUN, V-Pr.
 LI HSIEN-NIEN, V-Pr.
 PO I-PO, V-Pr.
 • Teng Tzu-hui, V-Pr.



JUNE 1967

CHINESE COMMUNIST CENTRAL GOVERNMENT ORGANS



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